Die konkurrenzrechtliche Handlung als soziale Sinneinheit

Eine Befassung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Mittäterschaft und der Gleichbehandlung von Tun und Unterlassen

Book cover: Die konkurrenzrechtliche Handlung als soziale Sinneinheit

Extent: 432 pages

Publisher: Wiley-VCH

Series: Studien und Beiträge zum Strafrecht

Language: German

Paperback (Forthcoming)

(November 2026)

ISBN: 9783162009012

6.1 x 9.13 inches

Price: $149.00

The concept of an act is central to the law of concurrence in criminal law. Despite its significance, however, the prevailing approach gives rise to problems of interpretation and inconsistencies, which Jan Bauerkamp examines.


The concept of an act for the purposes of concurrence is the central concept of the law of concurrence in criminal law. It determines which method of sentencing applies where multiple offences have been committed. Where several offences are committed by means of a single act, the generally more favourable principle of absorption applies, whereas sentencing for offences committed by means of several acts is governed by the principle of aggravation.
Despite the significance of this concept, neither the law nor the legislature provides a definition. Instead, by referring to the concept of an act and attaching different legal consequences to it, the legislature seeks to reflect a distinction “which […] is readily apparent in the vast majority of real-life situations and is intuitively perceived even by those without legal training” (BT-Drs. IV/650, p. 190).
However, the distinction is by no means as clear in prevailing practice as the legislature suggests. Even the interpretation of an act in the natural sense gives rise to substantial difficulties. The analysis presented here shows that its largely consistent application rests less on the prevailing, vaguely defined concept than on an external understanding of social unity. The criteria underlying this unity, however, remain unclear.
The same applies to the concept of a natural unity of acts and to its application in cases involving omissions, negligence, and co-perpetration. Jan Bauerkamp traces the assessment of social unity to the fact that forms of conduct are regarded as “dangerous” for the same reason. The decisive question, therefore, is whether the offences are based on an identical or at least interconnected potential for dangerousness in the offender’s conduct.